Client-server-based communications provide a facility by which users can get several services from home via the Internet. As the Internet is an insecure channel, it is needed to protect information of communicators. An authentication scheme can fulfill the aforementioned requirements. Recently, Huang et al. presented an elliptic curve cryptosystem-based password authentication scheme. This work has demonstrated that the scheme of Huang et al. has security weakness against the forgery attack. In addition, this paper also presented that the scheme of Huang et al. has some design drawbacks. Therefore, this paper has focused on excluding the security vulnerabilities of the scheme of Huang et al. by proposing an elliptic curve cryptosystem-based password authentication scheme using smart card. The security of our scheme is based on the hardness assumption of the one-way hash functions and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that our scheme is secured against known attacks. The performance of our scheme is also nearly equal when compared to related competing schemes.
INTRODUCTION
Client-server-based applications like Telecare Medical Information Systems, E-Banking, E-Payment, and Ecommerce are rapidly used because of its easy accessibility, efficiency, and security, but these applications are prone to attack by an adversary, because, in client-server-based applications, communications between a user (client) and server are performed through a public channel (Internet). Hence, it is needed to identify the communicators by a secure communication. A secure authentication scheme can provide the aforementioned facilities by which the users and server can identify each other through a secure communication. The basic mechanism of authentication protocol [1] is to verify a message MSG sent by Alice to Bob with a challenge where challenge is previously sent by Bob to Alice and challenge is either random nonce or timestamp or combination of nonce and timestamp. For this purpose, Alice combines challenge with MSG using some cryptographic techniques. Bob accepts MSG when he verifies the combination. However, the subsequent functionality and security necessities should be keep in mind when an authentication scheme is going to be designed:
Session key agreement: After mutual authentication between the participants, a common secret session key agreement is needed between them to carry secure communications over insecure communication medium by encrypting the messages by the session key. Efficient login procedure: For any authentication scheme, the smart card must verify the wrong inputs before computing the login message. By checking the incorrect inputs, extra communication overhead can be avoided. Therefore, it is crucial property of any authentication scheme. Efficient password update procedure: A valid user can update his or her password freely and securely not having the use of the server. Thus, in the password update phase, the smart card must verify the old password, so that an unauthorized user cannot change the authorized user's password even if he or she gets the smart card of that user. The aforementioned property should present in any robust and efficient authentication scheme. Traceability: In an authentication scheme, it is also needed that an intended receiver should able to trace the sender; otherwise, any one can mount denial of service attack [2] . Low cost: Computation cost, communication cost, and smart card storage cost are three parameters to measure the performance of an authentication scheme. Therefore, it has to be considered that these three parameters are reduced as much possible when an authentication scheme is to be designed.
In recent times, many smart card-based password authentication schemes have been put forwarded. The authentication schemes proposed in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] are based on only hash functions [15] [16] [17] . But, elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) [18] is used to design an authentication scheme due to its small key size than RSA-based cryptosystem. Therefore, ECC-based authentication schemes [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] have been developed by the researchers.
Previous works
In 2014, authors in [19] mentioned an authentication scheme, which is based on ECC [18] , but Islam and Khan [20] demonstrated that the scheme is unsuitable for practical world because it does not ensure the strong authentication in login as well as in authentication phases. Therefore, Islam and Khan proposed an improved scheme in [20] . In [21] , Chaudhry et al. pointed out that Islam and Khan's scheme cannot prevent forgery attack and then designed another improved scheme. Furthermore, Zhang and Zhu [29] disclosed that scheme in [20] also suffers from off-line password guessing and server spoofing attacks, respectively. Li et al. [22] introduced a user authentication scheme with the ECC; however, Mishra et al. [23] highlighted that the scheme of Li et al. [22] suffers from password guessing attack and replay attack. As a solution, Mishra et al. gave a furnished scheme in [23] . Liao and Hsiao [27] demonstrated a new authentication scheme using ECC. However, Zhao mentioned in [28] that the scheme in [27] suffers from the key settlement problem. Therefore, Zhao proposed a new authentication scheme in [28] .
Motivations and contributions
In 2014, Qu and Tan [24] put forwarded an ECC-based authentication scheme. Huang et al. [25] mentioned that the scheme of Qu and Tan [24] suffers from password guessing and impersonation attacks. Therefore, Huang et al. [25] suggested an improved authentication scheme based on ECC. However, we have shown that the scheme of Huang et al. [25] does not resist forgery attack. We have also shown that the scheme [25] has some design drawbacks, which indicate that their scheme is not perfect for real-world applications like Telecare Medical Information Systems, E-Banking, and E-Payment systems. However, as aforementioned section has discussed that the previous works fail to provide security, the pivotal focus of this work is to provide a suitable solution in secure authentication mechanism after eliminating security attacks of the scheme of Huang et al. [25] . Therefore, this paper has come up with a password and ECC-based efficient authentication scheme using smart card. The proposed scheme maintains the property of user anonymity as well as dynamic identity so that any adversary will not able to trace a particular user from the communication messages for different sessions between the user and server. Furthermore, security analysis claims that our scheme is free from all possible security threats due to hardness of ECDLP and one-way hash function.
Organization of the article
Section 2 briefly discusses some mathematical concepts. Section 3 describes an adversary model to analyze our scheme as well as the scheme of Huang et al. We briefly studied the scheme of Huang et al. in Section 4. Weaknesses of their scheme are shown in Section 5. In Section 6, we proposed a modified scheme to withstand the weaknesses of the scheme of Huang et al. Section 7 describes the cryptanalysis of the proposed scheme followed by its performance comparison with the related schemes in Section 8. In Section 9, conclusion of this work is given. length as an input and supplies a string of predetermined length. It can be symbolized as follows: H : A ! B, where A is a set of all binary string of unrestrained length and B is a set of all binary string of fixed length k.
Definition 1. If Adv H
A (t 1 ) is the advantage for the time duration t 1 of a polynomial tie bounded adversary A to choose a, b 2 A so that H(a) = H(b) for different values of a and b, we can take into account that Adv H A (t 1 ) is the probability in the advantage that is calculated by A for the random choices of t 1 span of time. Then, the cryptographic hash function H( ) is collision-resistant, if Adv H A (t 1 ) Ä 1 , for some negligible function 1 . Following is the representation of Adv H A (t 1 ):
where Pr[E] denotes the probability of event E.
Elliptic curve
Let p be a large prime number. An elliptic curve EC p , which is defined over the prime field F p of characteristic ¤ 2, 3, is the set of solutions (u, v) to the non-singular elliptic curve equation
wherea, b 2 F p and 4a 3 + 27b 2 Á ¤ 0 [18] , that is, (u 3 + au + b) mod p has two different roots. The elliptic curve group GC p is defined as˚(x, y) : x, y 2 F p and (x, y) 2 EC p « [ {O}, where "O" is called as "point at infinity" and it served as the identity element of GC p . The point P 2 EC p has the order n, if [n]P = O holds for the smallest integer n > 0. Let the point P = (u, v) is a point of EC p ; then, the negative of P is denoted as -P, that is, -P = (u, -v). Thus, we have -O = O. Let P, Q be two points on the curve (2), then P + Q = R, where the line joining P and Q intersects the curve (2) at the point -R, and the reflection of it about the x-axis is the point R. By the same way, we can describe the point doubling operation. This operation includes the addition of a point P on the curve (2) to itself to get other point Q on the curve (2). Let [2]P = Q, the tangent line at P intersects the curve (2) at the point -Q and the reflection of it about the x-axis is the point Q. Assume that Q = -P, then P + Q = P -P = O, that is, the line joining of P and -P intersects the curve (2) at the point O. This property is referred to as elliptic curve point subtraction. Let s 2 Z * p be a number and P is a point on EC p . Then, [s]P 2 EC p (u, v), the elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation is defined as [s]P = P + P + : : :
Definition 2. The elliptic curve-based discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) [18] is defined as follows: It is hard to discover a 2 Z * p from given R and P such that R = [a]P,
is the advantage of A to find a 2 Z * p from given Q and P such that R = [a]P, for the time span t 2 , we can take into account that Adv ECDLP A (t 2 ) is the probability in the advantage that is calculated by A for the random choices of t 2 span of time. Then, the ECDLP is called the hard problem, if Adv ECDLP A (t 2 ) Ä 2 , for some negligible function 2 . The representation of Adv ECDLP A (t 2 ) is as follows:
Definition 3. The elliptic curve-based computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) [31] over an elliptic curve is defined as follows: It is hard to find [a b]P 2 EC p (u, v) from given R, V and P such that R = [a]P,
is the advantage of A to find [a b]P from the given R, V, and P such that R = [a]P, V = [b]P for the t 3 duration of time, we can take into account that Adv CDHP A (t 3 ) is the probability in the advantage that is calculated by A for the random choice of the t 3 duration of time. Then, the CDHP is called a hard problem, if Adv CDHP
ADVERSARY MODEL
This section introduces an attacker model to examine the security of our scheme as well as the scheme of Huang et al. [25] . The Dolev-Yao threat model [32] is considered in which communications are carried out through an insecure channel. Therefore, the adversary A can trap, delete, or alter the transmitted messages. In this adversarial model, we assume that the smart card is not temper-resistant, that is, the adversary A can obtain the stored information of smart card based on the techniques explained in [33, 34] . Generally, the password and the identity of the user are low-entropy in nature and are selected from a small dictionary, that is, A can guess the identity and password individually using dictionary attack in polynomial time. However, A cannot guess identity and password simultaneously using any on-line/off-line procedure within polynomial time [35] . According to this adversary model, we consider two following cases: Case 1. A third party, who is not a registered user being an adversary A, can try to perform various attacks against the authentication system.
Case 2. A registered user being an adversary b
A can try to obtain secret parameters of the server by which he or she can mount various attacks against the authentication system. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF HUANG ET AL. SCHEME
This section provides a brief description of the authentication scheme of Huang et al. [25] . Table I shows the nomenclature that is used throughout the paper. Each phases of the scheme of Huang et al. are explained in the succeeding text.
Initialization phase
S picks a prime number p and produces an additive elliptic curve group GC p of order n. S also picks a base point P of order n over E/F p , a secret key s 2 R Z * n , and then calculates the public key as P pub = [s]P. S also selects the following hash functions:
Finally, S discloses public parameters hE/F p , P, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 , n, P pub i and retains s secret.
Registration phase
U i computes PID i = H 1 (ID i kpw i kr i ) after choosing their identity ID i , password pw i and a random number r i 2 R Z * n . U i then sends hID i , PID i i to S using a private channel. After receiving hID i , PID i i, S calculates AID i = [(H 1 (s) + 1) PID i ]P and BID i = H 2 (H 1 (ID i )kPID i ). Then, S stores hAID i , BID i i into the memory of a new smart card and dispatches the smart card to U i using a secure channel or by person. After getting the smart card, U i stores r i into it. Therefore, the smart card holds the parameters hAID i , BID i , r i i. Figure 1 shows a pictorial view of the registration phase of the scheme of Huang et al.
Login and authentication phase
Whenever U i likes to get services through S, he or she places the smart card into a terminal and submits ID i and pw i . Then, the smart card and S perform the following:
Then, the smart card verifies the equality of BID 0 i and BID i . If BID 0 i ¤ BID 0 i , and the smart card rejects U i by terminating the current session. Otherwise, the smart card picks a number a i randomly and calculates R i = [a i ]P,
where the random number c s is chosen by S. Then, S sends a reply message hD s , W s i to U i through the Internet. 
; otherwise, S terminates the session. Figure 2 shows the pictorial view of login, and authentication and key agreement phases, respectively, of the scheme of Huang et al.
Password change phase
To change the password, U i enters the smart card into terminal and inputs ID i and pw i to the smart card. The smart card then evaluates PID 0 
Finally, the smart card replaces
SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF THE SCHEME OF HUANG ET AL.
This section highlights some security vulnerabilities of the scheme of Huang et al. [25] .
Forgery attack
According to the adversary model given in Section 3, a genuine user can behave like an adversary b A. Therefore, b A itself tries to create a login message with an arbitrary identity. In the following, we will show that the login message with an arbitrary identity created by b
A is a forged and valid login message. b
A first executes the procedure EXP [attack] b A , which is described in Algorithm 1. For this purpose, b A extracts the information hAID i , BID i , r i i of U i 's smart card by observing power consumption [33, 34] .
A guesses a password pw [a] , an identity ID [a] , and two random numbers r [a] and
. We observed that 
The aforementioned explanation shows that any valid user can construct a login message on behalf of other user, and S accepts the login message. Therefore, b
A is able to create a forged and genuine login message login_forge. However, in dynamic identity-based authentication scheme, it is necessary that the server should trace the users' identities perfectly when they are communicating, but in the scheme of Huang et al., S does not store any identity of users into its database during the registration phase. Therefore, when a valid user as an attacker sends a login request message with an arbitrary identity to S, S is unable to trace the corresponding identity. As a result, who is actually sent the login message is untraced by S. Thus, the forgery attack can be mounted in the scheme of Huang et al. as shown earlier.
Moreover, an adversary can create finitely many valid and forged login request messages and then send these to make the server busy. In the mean time, if a valid user sent a valid login message, he or she has to wait for long time to validate it. This is another weakness of their system.
Other drawbacks
In the following, we will discuss some drawbacks of the scheme proposed by Huang et al. 
where PID i , M i , P pub and P 2 G p , but there is no such algorithm to compute multiplication of two points on an elliptic curve. Therefore, it is infeasible to compute AID i by S. Further, (H 1 (s)+1) is not feasible, because it is not defined how to compute addition of a point on elliptic curve and an integer. The correct mapping can be H 1 : {0, 1} * ! Z * p to overcome the infeasibility, but then also, DID i cannot be computed as there is no such algorithm to compute bit-wise XOR operation of two points on a elliptic curve.
OUR IMPROVED SCHEME
We will present an ECC-based password authentication scheme in this section. Our scheme incorporates the following phases:
Initialization phase
S picks a prime number p and an elliptic curve E/F p of order n. S then selects a base-point P over E/F p . Furthermore, S picks s 2 R Z * p and calculates the public key P pub = [s]P. S also selects three one-way hash functions
Finally, S announces public parameters hE/F p , P, H 1 , H 2 , n, P pub i while keeping s secret.
User registration phase
When a new user U i likes to do his or her registration, this phase is invoked.
Step 1: U i selects ID i and pw i uniquely. U i selects a number r i 2 R Z * p randomly and computes pwr i = H 1 (pw i kr i ). Then, he or she transmits hID i , pwr i i to S securely (or through secure channel).
Step 2: After receiving hID i , pwr i i, S computes DB = H 3 ([ID i s]P) and checks the availability of DB from its database. If it is available, S proceeds to further procedure; otherwise, S sends a nonavailability message to U i until available identity is not obtained from U i . S then computes
S stores the parameters hA i , D i i into a smart card and supplies the smart card through a private channel. Furthermore, S stores {DB} into its secure database.
Step 3: After obtaining the smart card, U i enters it into a terminal and submits r i , ID i and pw i . The smart card then calculates b r i = H 1 (ID i kpw i )˚r i and stores b r i into its memory. Finally, the smart card holds hA i , D i , b r i i. Note that, to retrieve r i from b r i , the adversary has to guess ID i and pw i at a time, which is hard within a polynomial time [35] . Figure 3 shows a pictorial view of the user registration phase of our proposed scheme.
Login phase
Whenever U i likes to get services through S, he or she enters his or her smart card into terminal and supplies his or her ID i and pw i . Then, the following steps are performed by the smart card:
Step 1: The smart card retrieves r 0 i by computing H 1 (ID i kpw i )˚b r i and computes pwr 0
The smart card then measures the equality between stored D i and computed D 0 i . For the inequality, the smart card stops the current session; otherwise, go to the succeeding step.
Step 2: After selecting a number b i 2 R Z * p , the smart card calculates An efficient ECC-based two-factor password authentication scheme
where T i 1 is the current login timestamp of U i . U i transmits a login request message hDID i , K i , R i , T i 1 i to S through Internet (a public channel).
Authentication and session key agreement phase
After execution of login phase, the smart card U i and S perform this phase as follows:
Step 1: After getting the login request message
If it is correct, S executes the succeeding step; otherwise, discards the login message.
Step
and checks whether the computed DB * and stored DB are equal. If the condition is correct, S executes the succeeding step; otherwise, the current session will be dismissed.
Step 3: S computes SID
checks whether K i =?K * i . If it is true, S proceeds to following step; otherwise, the current session will be terminated.
Step 4: S selects a number c s 2 R Z * p randomly and calcu-
If it is true, the smart card executes the next step; otherwise, rejects the reply message.
Step 6: The smart card computes
If it is false, U i rejects the reply message; otherwise, the smart card sends a message hW i , T i 2 i to S after computing W i =
and accepts SK i x as the shared secret session key. Step 7: After receiving hW i , T i 2 i at time T s 2 , S checks whether T i 2 -T s 1 Ä T holds. If it is true, S proceeds to the next; otherwise, rejects U i .
Step 8: S further checks W i =?H 1 SK s y kT i 2 kSID * i x Á holds. If it is valid, S accepts SK s x as the shared secret session key; otherwise, rejects U i . Figure 4 shows the pictorial view of login, and authentication and key agreement phases, respectively, of our proposed scheme.
Password change phase
To update password, U i enters the smart card into terminal and supplies ID i and pw i . The following steps are performed by the smart card:
Step 1: The smart card retrieves r 0 i by computing H 1 (ID i kpw i )˚b r i and then computes pwr 
A pictorial view of password change phase our scheme is given in Figure 5 .
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME
According to the adversary model given in the Section 3, this section will demonstrate that our scheme prevents all possible attacks.
Formal security analysis
This section presents the security analysis based on random oracle model, which is a generic group model of cryptography and it is used to examine the security of the authentication schemes [17] . The random oracles are defined in the following:
OracleH: OracleH is a random oracle. If a hash value b (= H(a) ) is given to it, it unconditionally produces a from b. OracleECDLP: OracleECDLP is a random oracle. It unconditionally produces a from the given values Q = [a]P and P. OracleCDLP: OracleCDLP is a random oracle. It unconditionally produces [ab]P from the given values Q = [a]P, R = [b]P and P.
Theorem 1. Assuming that the hash function H( ) acts like true random oracle and the ECDLP is a hard problem, the presented scheme is provably secure against the attacker A for obtaining the password pw i and the identity ID i of U i even if A obtains the information from U i 's smart card and the messages transmitted between U i and S.
Proof. We assume that A has the capability to extract pw i and ID i of U i . We also assume that U i lose the smart card or U i 's smart card is stolen by A. Thus, A can obtain the information hA i , D i , b r i i from the smart card of U i by power analysis [33, 34] . We also assume that A traps the login request message hDID i , K i , R i , T i 1 i, the reply message hQ i , V i , T s 1 i, and the message hW i , T i 2 i. A runs the 
experiment, EXP1 oracle
A, RUAS against our user authentication scheme (UAS) to derive pw i and ID i of U i as described in Algorithm 2. Call the oracle OracleH on the input [H 1 (ID i ks)] * and retrieve the information ID i and s as (ID ** i ks * ) OracleH([H 1 (ID i ks)] * ) 13: Call the oracle OracleH on the input pwr * i and retrieve the information pw i and r i as (pw * i kr * i ) OracleH(pwr * i ) 14 :
Algorithm 2 EXP1 oracle
Call the oracle OracleH on the input [H 1 (ID i kpw i )] * and retrieve the information ID i and pw i as (ID *** i kpw ** i ) OracleH([H 1 (ID i kpw i )] * ) 16: if (ID * i == ID ** i == ID *** i ) && (pw ** i == pw * i ) then 17: Return 1 (Success) 18: else 19: Return 0(Fail) 20: end if 21: else 22: Return 0 (Fail) 23 
: end if
The success probability for EXP1 oracle A, UAS is defined as Succ1 oracle
Then, the advantage of EXP1 oracle A, UAS is given by
, where during the running time t, the maximum is considered for all A; qH is the number of queries made by A to the oracle OracleH and qDLP denotes the number of queries made by A to the oracle OracleECDLP. The proposed scheme is provably secure against A for obtaining pw i and ID i of U i , if Adv1 oracle A, UAS (t, qH, qDLP) Ä , for any small > 0. According to the algorithm EXP1 oracle A, UAS , if A earns success to evaluate the inversion of H( ) and also gets success to solve the ECDLP, then only he or she can successfully retrieve pw i and ID i of U i by using the random oracles OracleH and OracleECDLP and wins the game. But from Definitions 1 and 2, we know that Adv OracleH A (t) Ä 1 , for any small 1 > 0 and Adv OracleECDLP A (t) Ä 2 , for any small 2 > 0. Hence, we obtain Adv1 oracle A, RUSA (t, qH, qDLP) Ä , for any small > 0, because the presented scheme depends on both Adv OracleH A (t) and Adv OracleECDLP A (t). Therefore, the proposed scheme provides security against A for obtaining pw i and ID i of U i .
Theorem 2. Based on the supposition that the hash function H( ) behaves like true random oracle and the CDHP is a hard problem, our presented scheme is provably secure against A for obtaining the session key SK i x (= SK s x ) established between U i and S even if A gets information stored into U i 's smart card and traps messages, which are transmitted between U i and S.
Proof. We assume that A has the capability to compute or extract the session key SK i x (= SK s x ), which is calculated between U i and S. We also consider the same assumptions as described in Theorem 1. A then runs the experiment, EXP2 oracle A, UAS against our UAS to derive SK i x , as described in Algorithm 3. We can neglect the parameters hD i , A i , b r i i of the smart card, because the shared secret session key SK s x (= SK i x ) depends only on the random numbers. Therefore, A tries to extract or compute the session key from the login and authentication messages, which are publicly available to every one.
We define the success probability for EXP2 oracle qH is the number of queries made by A to the oracle OracleH and qDHP is the number of queries made by A to the oracle OracleCDHP. The presented scheme is said to be provably secure against A for obtaining SK i x , if Adv2 oracle A, UAS (t, qH, qDHP) Ä , for any small > 0.
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Algorithm 3 EXP2 oracle
&& (SK * s == SK s ) then 5: if (SK * i y == SK s y ) then 6: Accept SK * s x or SK s x as secret shared session key 7:
Return 1 (Success) 8: else 9: Return 0 (Fail) 10: end if 11: else 12: Return 0 (Fail) 13: end if According to the algorithm EXP2 oracle A, UAS , if A earns success to perform inversion of H( ) and also gets success to solve the CDHP, A can successfully obtain the secret session key SK i x by using the random oracles OracleH and OracleCDHP and wins the game. But from Definitions 1 and 3, we know that Adv OracleH A (t) Ä 1 , for any small 1 > 0 and Adv OracleCDHP A (t) Ä 2 , for any small 2 > 0. Because, we obtain Adv1 oracle A, UAS (t, qH, qDHP) Ä , for any small > 0, because the proposed scheme depends on both Adv OracleH A (t) and Adv OracleCDHP A (t). Therefore, the presented scheme provides security against A for obtaining the session key SK i x (= SK s x ) computed by U i and S.
Informal security analysis
Security of our scheme in informal way is evaluated in this section.
Off-line guessing attack.
According to adversary model presented in the Section 3, a third party as well as a valid user tries to extract and guess the secret information, namely, identity ID i and password pw i of U i as well as the secret key s and the random numbers {b i , c s } from the known parameters of S. For this purpose, we assume that an adversary A has the knowledge of smart card's information hA i , D i , b r i i [33, 34] and also trapped the login message hDID i , K i , R i , T i 1 i, the reply message hQ i , V i , T s 1 i, and the message hW i , T i 2 i.
From smart card's information
guess ID i and pw i , because he/she has to predict r i , ID i and pw i at a time to compute b r i , which is not possible in polynomial time [35] .
cannot guess ID i , s and pw i , because he or she has to predict s, ID i and pw i at a time, which is again not possible in polynomial time [35] .
, A cannot extract ID i , s and pw i due to one-wayness of the hash function.
Therefore, A is unable to obtain the secret information s, ID i , and pw i from the smart card's information.
, A cannot extract the random number b i , because he or she has to solve the DLP, which is a hard problem. -If A tries to extract ID i and b i from
x , he or she has to again solve the DLP or has to predict ID i and b i at a time, which is impossible to solve in polynomial time. Therefore, A cannot extract the random number b i , identity ID i , and secret key s of S from the login message. As login message does not depend on password pw i , A is unable to extract or guess pw i from hDID i , K i , R i , T i 1 i. From the reply messages hQ i , V i , T s 1 i and hW i , T i 2 i: -From Q i (= [c s ]P), A cannot extract the random number c s , because he or she has to solve the DLP, which is computational infeasible.
[H 1 (ID i ks)]P y ÁÁ , A cannot extract ID i , s and the random numbers {b i , c s }, because the inversion of the hash function is hard.
Therefore, A cannot extract the random numbers {b i , c s }, identity ID i , and secret key s of S from the reply messages. As the reply messages are independent of password pw i , A is unable to extract or guess pw i from hQ i , V i , T s 1 i and hW i , T i 2 i.
A valid user as an adversary b
A is unable to guess or obtain the secret information (i.e., identity and password) of an another valid user for the same reasons as described earlier. But as the adversary b
A is a valid user, he or she knows his or her identity ID b A and password pw b A and also can extract H 1 (ID b A ks) by computing
A is unable to obtain the secret key s of S because the inversion of the hash function is hard. Thus, our scheme offers the security against the guessing attack.
Forgery attack.
According to the adversary model presented in the Section 3, a third party as well as a valid user try to create the forged messages against our scheme. For this purpose, we presume that an adversary has knowledge of smart card's information hA i , D i , b r i i and trap the login message
Case 1:
The A, who is not a legitimate user of S, is an outsider.
Forged login message generation: In this case, A executes the following steps to login into S on behalf of U i by making a login request message at timestamp T A such that (T s 1 -T A ) Ä T holds.
Step 1: A chooses an identity ID A , a random number b A 2 Z * p and the secret key s A 2 Z * p of S. Step 2: Then, A computes SID A = SID A x ,
After getting the login message
Then, S checks whether DB * is present in its database. 
then he or she also has to correctly compute SID i (= [H 1 (ID i ks)]P) as V i is computed using SID i . But as discussed earlier, no secret information (i.e, ID i and s) is leaked from the known parameters. Therefore, A is unable to create a valid reply message against our scheme.
Case 2: The b
A is a legitimate user and he or she tries to impersonate other legitimate user of S.
Forged login message generation : In this case, a valid user b
A tries to login into S by masquerading another valid user say, U j . As b A is a valid user, thus, he or she knows his or her identity and password. If b A is going to create a login message, he or she has to know the secret key s of S, because SID j is computed using ID j and s, but it is impossible to extract s by b
A being a valid user as shown in Section 7.2.1. Forged reply message generation: Same as Case 1.
User anonymity.
In our scheme, the identity ID i of U i is secret. Therefore, ID i is not sent directly with the messages during communication. For this purpose, SID i = H 1 (ID i ks) P and DID i = ID i˚Li x are used rather than only ID i . The guessing attack given in Section 7.2.1 demonstrates that an adversary cannot predict and obtain the identity of a user from his or her known parameters. Furthermore, after getting a login message, S can correctly trace the sender because S extracts ID i from DID i by computing L i x˚D ID i . Not that only S can compute the correct L i because s is only known to S. Therefore, an adversary cannot extract ID i from DID i as he or she does not know the secret key s of S, and it cannot be guessed or extracted from the known and computes pwr 0
i y kpwr 0 i ). Now, the smart card examines whether D i and D 0 i are equal. If D i ¤ D 0 i , the smart card rejects U i ; otherwise, it gives permission to U i to enter a new password. Therefore, if U i submits an incorrect password by some mistakes, the smart card can easily detect the wrong inputs. Furthermore, without taking any help of the server, users can change their password. Thus, the aforementioned explanation indicates that the present scheme achieves the user-friendly and efficient password change phase.
COMPARISON
This section compares the performances of the scheme designed in this paper with other ECC-based authentication schemes, namely, schemes of Xu et al. [19] , Islam and Khan [20] , Chaudhry et al. [21] , Li et al. [22] , Mishra et al. [23] , Qu and Tan's [24] , and Huang et al. [25] . However, Table II demonstrates that the existing schemes are unsuitable for real environments, because they do not prevent all known attacks. In Section 1, it has been described that the schemes of Islam and Khan [20] , Xu et al. [19] , Li et al. [22] , and Qu and Tan [24] are vulnerable against some common security attacks. Moreover, Section 7 has shown that our scheme can prevent all known attacks. Hence, the present scheme provides more security than related existing schemes.
Basically, the login phase and authentication phase with key agreement are used frequently; therefore, we have compared these two phases of the present scheme with the schemes in [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . Table III shows the computational cost, storage cost, and communication overhead comparison of the schemes in [19] [20] [21] 24, 25] with our scheme. Here, T dec , T h , T pm , T in and T m denote the time required for decryption operation, hash operation, point multiplication operation, inverse computation, and multiplication operation, respectively. According to the discussion provided in [36, 37] , we observed that T dec T h > T m T in > T pm . The execution time for computing 11 hash operations in two phases is needed in the proposed scheme, which is lower than schemes in [19, 22] , [24] , and [25] . A reasonable assumption that the length of ID i is 64 bits. The hash function H( ), encryption/decryption (AES-128), random numbers, and timestamp are 128 bits each. The elliptic curve point P (= (P x , P y )) and the prime number p are 256 and 1024 bits each, where x and y co-ordinates returns 128 bits each. To transmit a login message, the communication cost (total number of bits are needed to transmit a message) of our proposed scheme is (256+128+ 128 + 128) = 640 bits, which is lower than the schemes in [21, 24, 25] . Furthermore, the communication cost for transmitting messages that are generated in authentication and key agreement phase is (256 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128) = 768 bits, which is needed to reduce in future. The storage cost (total number of bits are required to store all the parameters into the smart card) of the proposed scheme is (128 + 128 + 128) = 384 bits, which is again lower than schemes in [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] .
From the aforementioned analysis, we found that our scheme prevents all possible attacks. However, the present scheme provides the trade-off among storage cost, computational cost, communication cost, and security than existing schemes. Therefore, it can be said that the present scheme delivers efficiency and more security than other schemes. Thus, the present scheme is acceptable for realworld applications.
CONCLUSION
This research analyzed that the scheme of Huang et al. has some security loopholes. To solve these loopholes, this paper has presented a ECC-based authentication scheme, which is applicable for client-server-based applications. Additionally, by using the presented scheme, users can easily aware about their wrong inputs (if any) in login and password update phases, respectively. As the presented scheme holds the property of dynamic identity of users, therefore, we can claim that the proposed scheme if free from user traceability. Through the analysis of security as well as performance with the related schemes, it is found that the presented scheme has more security attributes, and efficiency features with respect to computational cost and storage cost. In the future, we will study the biometricbased three-factor authentication method to enhance the security of the two-factor system. In addition, we will simulate the proposed scheme in AVISPA security verification tool and in BAN logic model as well.
